

v 1.0

Consistent process and products to create shared understanding for (interagency incident) responders at all levels – Agency Administrators to the resources implementing the plans. Focusing our efforts on our priority values as we develop strategies that minimize responder risks while striving for meaningful work with the highest probability of success.

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Background and Purpose:

The Incident Strategic Alignment Process (ISAP) finds its roots in 2017 when it was recognized nationally that each IMT had different methodology and products to capture and share critical risk-related communication. This disparity, while well-intentioned, created additional distraction and confusion rather than reducing it or adding transparency. The ISAP is a culmination and combination of the Strategic Risk Assessment and Strategic Operations efforts that were developed and piloted during the 2021 and 2022 seasons.

The intent of this document is to provide useful information for responders using the ISAP as part of their overall incident planning process. This guide includes tips, suggestions, and reference materials to support robust conversations.

To ensure a consistent repeatable process, it is recommended that users do not customize the products developed, but instead personalize the process to best fit into their IMT planning cycle and meet the needs of the incident

It is important to recognize that there are several components to the ISAP all of which require process, products, documentation and most importantly conversation. The focus throughout should be on stimulating meaningful conversations, not filling in products or letting the documents drive the flow. Documentation does, however, provide durability and shareability of decisions, conversation highlights and concerns while providing insight into the evolution of choices made over the life of an incident. It is critical to capture such items and insure they are transferred between IMT and AA charged with managing incidents.

The ISAP is anchored in Four Pillars:

- 1.Critical Values at Risk
- 2.Strategy & Strategic Actions
- 3.Responder Risk
- 4. Probability of Success

This document outlines the pillars and steps of the process. *Remember* - this work is not to be completed once and shelved for the rest of the incident. It is cyclical, and should be revisited, revalidated, or re-done as needed. Frequency may very between incidents.

It is recognized that not all incidents, or even all portions of a fire, may need the same level of ISAP engagement. Those with longer life expectancies, in more intricate operating environments, or in competition for resources are ideally suited, whereas rapidly moving, short duration incidents may find less value. Either way, use of the four pillars and the intended conversation will provide meaning on every fire.

Pillar 1: Critical Values at Risk

<u>Timing:</u> 30-60 Minutes: Prior to SRA meetings (*As soon as possible i.e.at or following in-brief OR within 24 hours of TOC*)

<u>Participation:</u> AA from every jurisdictional agency, local FMO, other local organizational reps, IC, OSC. Optional would be an additional notetaker (PSC?). This may need to be a "container conversation" to gain trust, and allow AA to discuss openly value ratings and priorities. The IC may need to facilitate the conversation.

<u>Resources:</u> RMA Analytics (PODs w/Summary – cNVC Assets & Drinking water, Housing Unit Density & WUI), specialists, LTAN/FBAN products to determine "at risk" (FSPro, Near Term, Short term runs), READs, other local experts.

Purpose and Intent:

Critical Values at Risk (CVAR) are essential as one of the four pillars of this work. We cannot fully understand our tasking as responding IMTs if we do not have an accurate picture of the Why behind our tasks: What are we protecting, Why is it important, and How important is it? This is the first step in ISAP: to understand the **WHY** (Values) to inform the **HOW** (Strategy), determine the **SHOULD** (Responder Risk) & **IF** (Probability of Success).

A significant amount of prework (preignition planning) may have been conducted for the area of the incident: Land Management Plan, HVRAs, PODs, and/or other pre-attack data. While valuable, this information can be overwhelming, outdated, inconclusive, or not in use by all jurisdictional entities involved in the incident. This highlights the significance of having this post-ignition Values conversation with local entities with jurisdictional responsibility as soon as possible to inform IMT planning accurately and quickly.

The initial exercise will capture most of these critical values but will likely need to be repeated if the planning area expands during the life of the incident.

What makes a Value "critical" or "at risk?"

There can literally be dozens or hundreds of values for an incident. We rarely have the capacity as responders to address everything that is deemed important to hosting agencies. IMTs should not select or prioritize the list – that is up to Agency Administrator(s) and local authorities that have the greatest insight into these values and the roles they play in the communities and ecosystems. How do host units narrow the focus for IMT? It is helpful to frame Critical Values at Risk using these descriptions:

"Critical Values" are those that they'd ask the responder to accept an elevated level of risk to protect (not an undue risk, just slightly elevated) or those values that drive strategy, while lesser values or assets may influence tactics.

"At Risk" implies that they are located within the WFDSS planning area or, if needed, the area the incident is likely to impact within the next 14 – 21 operational periods.

Values can be Spatial (infrastructure, cultural/historic sites, watersheds or natural resources, timber stands, etc. or more intangible (political, security, economic, social).

Capture if these things are "real" despite them not being able to be physically identified on a map. They may be loosely connected to a value or group of values (community, cultural site, occupation or tourism such as "wilderness", etc.). Naming them during this conversation helps identify "gorillas" that need to be considered and potentially addressed later.

Goal:

Engage in a conversation that:

Compiles a list of Critical Values at Risk (capturing their specific locations on a map) and includes a severity rating from the AA as to the level of impact the fire would have on each (refer to Terminology and Definitions: Appendix B). This conversation may take 30-60 minutes and AA along with other key identified stakeholders should be in attendance.

Process:

- Display a map with the current fire perimeter (paper or electronic)
- Begin in one location and move around the incident:
 - o Mark (circle, lines, etc.) each value that is discussed.
 - Capture details about each as you move around in the Values Excel or other similar format (refer to "Other Resources 2").
- For each Value: ask the AAs to collectively rate the Severity of Impact: **WHEN** the fire impacts the value, how bad would it be? (NOT**IF** it will (that's probability)
- Once the conversation has moved full circle on the map around the incident perimeter, examine the list and turn the group's attention to prioritization. The Goal for this step is to create a prioritized list of critical values across the incident, not priorities by agency or jurisdiction.
 - This may be delineated 1 through 10 with each having its own number or perhaps broken into 3 priorities (1 through 3). There is no right or wrong way to categorize or show the rankings – but a ranking is essential to be able to share how resources or efforts may need to be assigned to best address the host unit(s) truly understood highest values.
 - If 10 values were designated as a Catastrophic severity: How do they rank out within just those 10?
 - Do the same with the group of values deemed Critical, then Moderate.
 - o Is there a critical or moderate severity value that might be of higher priority than a catastrophic & why?

NOTE: This part of the conversation can be the most challenging for AA: rating is one thing, but ranking is another. Ranking along will not determine the fate of each value – multiple other factors are involved (resources available, fire spread, value location, value susceptibility, etc.).

 At the close of the meeting, offer to have the conversation notes cleaned up, loose items chased down, and then share the draft with the AA for them to confirm it was captured correctly.

NOTE: A values template identifying the needed information can be found as a tab located within the SRA Product to facilitate and document this conversation.

Supplies:

Items recommended to best capture this conversation:

- Operations or Unit Area Map (hard copy or electronic) plotted or projected
- Markers/highlighters/pen
- SRA Product Form values tab

 plotted or projected

Tips/Notes:

- Refer to the "Other References Section" of this guide (Page 27) for a sample screen shot of the values tab along with other samples of values information. Appendix B (Page 22) has the terms and definitions the AA will need to rate the Severity to each Value.
- Organically, the AA describe the value and state its historic/cultural/economic/functional relevance and importance. Capture this in the notes section.
- They also tend to physically describe the value construction materials, vegetation in the area, access to it, whether it is occupied or staffed, etc. Capture this in the notes as well.
- As you look at the map and move around the fire perimeter to capture values: Watch
 for things that are marked on the map but not included: do they no longer exist? Are
 they not Critical? Are they simply not known to the AA?
- What are the intangible values that are important but may not be displayed on the
 map? Things like social standing/agency reputation/local economics are hard to put on
 a map but may need to be a part of the conversation once the tangible items have been
 discussed. You may also find that they are directly related to a specific value
 (wilderness, lookout, etc.)
- Watch out for conversations where one AA might dominate the conversation, prepare for this by reviewing the status of relationships, pre-existing values tensions, etc.
- Make a list of follow-up items:
 - AA know of some Value but not its exact location for the map who does have that knowledge and how can we get that info? Who will follow up to get it and when?

CVAR Conversation Prompts:

This list of questions is NOT intended to be used as written, but rather as a list of prompts and items to include as the conversation unfolds.

- Why are we/the IMT here?
- What are the expectations of the public? What are the needs of the local officials and how are they playing into the operating theater?
- What is driving the need to engage when our intuition is signaling otherwise?
- Utility Rights-of-way: Underground or above? Size/scope of supply lines? Metal or wood poles?
- Transportation corridors: single source ingress/egress? Significant arteries to major communities?
- Buildings: Ownership (private, federal, state?), historic significance? Occupied seasonally or permanent? Construction materials and defensible space?
- Natural resources (habitat, streams, forests): T & E species? Fire adapted or evolved and dependent? Tourism ties? Watershed/water source implications? What makes it unique?
- Cultural resources: sub-terranean (avoid ground disturbance)? Burnable?
- Bridges: construction materials? Weight limits?
- Communities: defensible space? Temperament? Power/water/communication sources? Public safety infrastructure location (EMS, law enforcement, fire departments, hospitals, etc.)? Economic links?
- Communications Towers: equipment ownership and purpose (cell company, Emergency government, local unit repeater, 911, etc.)? Material? Defensible space? Access?
- Timber: Sales: sold or just prepped? Active harvest? Ownership? Seedlings or mature?
- Wilderness: Character, infrastructure, economic impact (outfitter, guides, etc.)
- What makes this thing worth taking an elevated level of risk to protect (and/or how does it influence strategy)?
- Can everything be catastrophic? Then how can we prioritize resources/efforts?

ISAP Hallway Homework

To successfully have an informed and meaningful group conversation there is work that will need to be completed ahead of time to be prepared to efficiently implement the ISAP process. This prep-work incorporates components of pillars 1, 2, 3 & 4 and is referred to as "Hallway Homework".

Hallway Homework takes place after the Critical Values at Risk conversation, and prior to each Strategy/SRA meeting where one or more strategic actions may be discussed.

Pillar 2: Strategy & Strategic Actions

<u>Timing</u>: 30-60 minutes: Prior to SRA conversations/strategy meetings

<u>Participation:</u> Ops, Safety, FBAN/IMET

Resources to Use: RMA Analytics (SDA, PCL, Snag Hazard, Eval Layer), ground truthing and local

experts, fire history

The first step, often accomplished with hallway homework, is for Operations to frame up the strategic action(s) that are to be discussed, identifying what actions are being proposed, where they are being proposed, what type/kind/number of resources are needed to accomplish the actions, and the duration it will take to complete the work. This also allows time for supporting analytical products to be produced for reference during the Strategy/SRA meeting.

Strategic Actions clearly articulate the How, Where, Who and Why of the plan. These Action statements should tie to incident objectives, 204 instructions and verbal briefings. They will frame each Strategy/SRA conversation to help focus the discussion.

Ex: Keep the fire north of the Quick Water River and west of Hwy 123 by building direct line to connect natural features to protect the community of Big Town and the high voltage transmission lines along the east side of highway 123.

Safety and Ops need to be tied together as strategies are being developed – Safety should NOT wait until Ops "hands" them strategies before they are involved in considering what factors make options viable. Safety and the IMT should not be left to "Mitigate away" effects of a bad strategy.

It is critical that Operations can articulate the strategy and each component so the AA, Cooperators, and rest of IMT understand.

Divide the incident into chunks with similar work, objectives, and Values. To do this ask:

- What actions are we considering?
- Don't spend valuable time on "no-brainer" sections of the fire where will the fire create real dilemmas?
- Where is the most decision space and where is the least?

For each Strategic Action, look at a relevant duration: time to work completion, fire arrival at that location or season ending event (beyond just the next shift or only the IMT's tenure on the fire): This is critical in the change from operational to strategic conversations.

Finance will need to know what is being proposed so they can prepare cost projections and be prepared to discuss potential financial ramifications for the group's consideration.

Ask yourself:

- Is the current strategy aligned with the Course of Action in the WFDSS decision and designed to protect the Critical Values? Is an amended decision needed?
- Is the strategy supported by available resources, predicted weather, analytics, anticipated fire behavior, and time to impact on the Critical Values?
- Do Strategic Line analysis patterns match Green/Amber/Red with SDI/PCL/Snag Hazard?
- How many heart beats does it take to accomplish the work? Do we have them?
- If an IMT has limited time, where should they focus?
 - What is the piece of ground that has the highest social political concerns?
 - o What Strategic Action has the highest level of risk to responders?
 - What Strategic Action has the biggest threat to CVAR?

Strategy should inform objectives (not the other way around), this will allow AA and IMT to adjust objectives as the incident progresses.

Pillar 3: Responder Risk

<u>Timing</u>: 30-60 minutes: as needed to discuss and revisit each Strategic Action (+/- 3-5 times) <u>Participation:</u> IMT C&G, Medical Unit, Air Ops, FBAN, IMET, AA, Local FMO, critical Cooperators, IC discretion

<u>Resources to Use</u>: RMA Analytics (Snag Hazard, Evac Times), ground truthing, local experts, IMT SME, field assets (Pilots, IHC, etc.)

Once the strategics actions are identified, information is gathered to inform the responder risk ratings for each of the 6 major risk influencers for the actions being discussed (*Ground Transportation, Rapid Fire Growth, Hit-by-Hazards, Aviation Operations, Human Factors, and Medical Response & Capability*).

The Risk Influencers consider the common mechanisms of injury and help focus on a strategic level more broadly: wider geography, multiple tasks, diversity of resources involved over a longer duration. They are not a comprehensive list of all hazards.

Each Risk Influencer will benefit from thought and input collaboratively gathered (beyond just Safety Officers). Air Ops, MEDL, Logistics (ground support, COML, etc.) functions, etc. Avoid silo work by having SME begin the conversation while considering other perspectives. Hallway conversations or small group work can preload the full conversations. Field verification may be needed to best inform ratings and discussion.

Focus on the biggest responder risk concerns that could change strategy or that confirm/validate that the current strategic action is the best from a safety standpoint.

Tier to (and glean from) other safety messaging for most effectiveness: 215R for daily (operational) risk which can help focus on more specific (tactical) risks/mitigations for specific work locations on 204, Pre-Ops meetings, Operational briefings, tailgates on Divisions, etc.

Use the discussion to help close "The Gap" between perception of associated risks vs. actual actions and risk.

The "ratings" are not as important as the specific considerations that fed into the assigned rating (concerns, mitigations, options, etc.). Having the SME or others explain their thoughts is valuable: Air Ops, Medical, SOF, Ops, etc.

Discussion provides an opportunity to pause and insure there is understanding and acceptance around planned actions.

Red ratings are not unusual: don't avoid them or try to mitigate them away. Be honest and focus communication, understanding and intention in these areas.

Responder Risk includes ALL incident personnel: ground support drivers, PIOs, pilots, etc. consider other employees beyond "operational" exclusively.

Responder Risk Influencer Prompts:

Note: This is a potential list of items that can be considered for each of the 6 Risk Influencers – it is NOT an all-encompassing list! Add others if needed and *do not* cover all of these during every conversation!

Overarching considerations:

- Is there something(s) that affects everything? Weather, fatigue, resource shortages, etc.
- What does success look like? Do we all agree to that common picture?
- Is the potential for harm/injury outweighed by the preservation of the Critical Value?
- Are mitigations to the physical hazards realistic? Are they working as intended?
- How the CVAR and responder risk influencers intersect (Juice worth the Squeeze) highlights risk tolerances.
- What is truly acceptable vs unacceptable risk to the decision makers?

1. Ground Transportation: (Logs, Ops, READs)

- Consider Rental rigs, Engines, Heavy equipment, UTVs, ground support drivers, logistics contractors
- Consider driving, walking/hiking in, boat use, pack strings, etc. ALL ground transportation
- Surface conditions? (blacktop, dozer line, washboards, dust, 4x4 required, etc.)

- Speed limits
- **User groups** (tourists, general public, fire traffic only, school buses, etc.)
- Turnout limitations or one-way traffic?
- Wildlife?
- Ground support: being used heavily? Skills of drivers (maps, radios, etc.)?
- Accident trends?
- Uptick of flat tires on the fire?
- Fire suppressions resources but also for ground support, IMT, etc. ALL assigned personnel

2. Rapid Fire Growth: (FBAN, IMET, SOPL, READs, FMO, Ops)

- a. **Evacuations:** Are we where we need to be? Do we feel as if a good plan is in place? How is commo with local Law Enforcement? Do all responders know the plan and the MAPs for withdrawal?
- b. **Weather**: Unique local factors to be aware of? What are we doing to address weather conditions and what is the expectation? How fast will the changes occur? How will IMET share updates?
- **Inversions:** timing of lift, if it does lift at all?
- Reburn potential?
- Heavy duff layer/ash pits
- Slope?
- Night-time thermal belts?
- **Disengagement points known?** Escape routes in place and timed? Safety or
- Fire activity increasing consistently in afternoon?
- Can the fire surprise us with a run? What would it take for that to occur?
- Are we in "normal" fire season for this area?
- Are the fuels (and fire behavior) "typical" for this time of year?
 - c. Entrapment potential?
- 3. Hit-By Hazards: (Ops, READ, FBAN)
 - Rolling debris: rocks, terrain a factor?
 - Fire weakened/bug killed timber? Are trees coming down during the shifts?
 - Tree species nuances (shallow roots, etc.)
 - Reports of Green trees falling?
 - Slips/Trips/Falls an issue? Medical Unit seeing sore ankles/knees?
 - Equipment/Aviation?

4. Aviation Operations: (Air Ops, Ops, Logs)

a. **Air resources:** Helibase adequate? Anything we need to consider? Inversions limiting operations? Multiple bases to prevent all aircraft from being smoked in? (Catastrophic/Unlikely are very common ratings for aviation operations b/c

if an incident occurs involving an aviation resource it is rare for it not to have catastrophic outcomes)

- **Helispots:** adequate number suggested/reconned/approved/mapped?
- Are operations being successful?
- Reliance on aircraft: for lookouts/commo links/logistical support?
- Flight times: can they fly earlier or later than they are? Should they?
- Conditions?
- **Tasks** being asked (heli-wells v open lakes?)
- Crash sites or landing areas? Heavily timbered country? Steep? Relatively open or flat?
- Smokejumpers or cargo drops, Heli-rapellers, etc. in use?
- UAS in use?
- Wires, towers, etc.?
- Are they scooping and what do those water sources look like?
- Bucket drops?
- 5. Human Factors: (all) How do all these human factors affect decision making? Which actually have the potential to cause injury to responders?
 - a. Resource allotment: Do we have what we need? Any concerns?
 - b. Mental Perspective: Fatigue or focus issues? Is 2:1 met everywhere, including ICP? Anyinterventions needed (peer support or HRSP)? Personalities at play?
 - c. **Anything we need the LOFR** to concentration on with relationships or concerns to be addressed?
 - d. **Taking care of the Firefighter**: Food going smoothly? Lodging adequate? Supplies? Laundry? Access to showers? Trends in medical?
 - e. **Camp needs:** Do we have everything in place for inclement or shift in weather: ice scrapers, wind, prolonged heat, etc.?
 - f. **Psychologically where are we** at and what might be out there?
 - g. Communication: How are things on the line? Do we need more repeaters or to move the ones wehave? Is there bleed over on Tac channels? Are people serving as human repeaters? Where and Why?
 - h. **Leadership:** Enough middle management? Transitioning? Number of Trainees in place?
 - i. Community Empathy: what can we do from an empathy level?
 - j. **HSRP**: Concerns that may pop up?
 - Number of Assigned Days this year for most resources?
 - Tasks: repetition? Span of control? Experience level and quals in line with assigned tasks?

- **Evacuations:** residents remain in place during evacs? Private property likely to be impacted/orwas?
- Social-Political pressures?
- Smoke Exposure: day and night? ICP and line?
- Trends in Medical?
- Distractions (moving camps, IA bust, COVID, etc.)?
- Blind Spots/Unknowns:

wnat has changed since yesterday's meeting? weather, fire
conditions, resources (gaining or demob), chipper now on site?
Have things improved or gotten worse?
Potential Failure points: Shared with resources?
Values to protect: shared and known by resources?
PIOs: What messaging may be needed?
What are we missing?

6. Medical Response and Capability: (MEDL, Logs, SOFs, Air, Ops):

NOTE: Focus on access/tools and the resiliency of the infrastructure available to support a responder having a bad day - NOT the potential injury severity!

- a. Hazards: location, special resources needed, limitations?
- **Resources:** ALS/BLS? Response times, access?
- Medical Extraction Map in RMA: time the litter is lifted off the ground to begin patient removal tocare facility
- IWI: Resources have reviewed IWI/medical plan for assigned areas
- Delayed medical response and/or extraction?
- Use/availability of Local community resources? Sole use or also supporting the local residential needs?
- Medical resources assigned to the incident or shared?
- Transport capability or on-site treatment only?
- **REM, Short-haul, Hoist?** Is there a potential to use that to overextend?
- What is the potential for night extraction needs? Are we prepared for that?
- Are there environmental factors that may limit the availability?
- 7. Other: Fill in the Blank: (Any/All):
 - a. If needed, use this space to add or highlight a specific risk that is worth noting

Pillar 4: Probability of Success

Timing: 15-30 minutes: as part of SRA for each SA

Participation: IMT, AA, all


Resources to Use: RMA Analytics (PCL, SDI, Snag Hazard, Season Ending Predictions), others

P(Success) Prompts:

Probability of Success:

NOTE: despite this being at the top of the Product, there may be value to work through the conversation before populating the P(Success)% as discussion will help inform the rating.

- Ask what considerations people are thinking of when they assess P(Success).
- O What are the knowns that they are confident in?
- What are the items that feel less reliable or more uncertain?
 To start narrowing the focus on a P(Success) that resonates: Ask 1 or more attendees to give an opinion of the P(Success) % based on the conversation.
- Consider using the probability of success Calculator located as at tab titled P(Success) on the SRA Product Form for reference.
- What does the success actually mean, what is it based on?
 - Do RMA analytics (PCL/SDI/Snag Haz) support estimates?
- What is an acceptable P(Success)? How do we discuss this and decide to move forward or re-evaluate alternative(s)?
- Is there buy-in and support in place by all to accomplish the plan? Logs? Finance? PIO? Medical? Ops? Safety?
- Operations may determine the P(Success), but what considerations do other functional areas have that may need to be discussed that could impact P(Success)?
- What's the decision maker's comfort level for P(Success)? Does it vary depending on the type of Critical Values at Risk? What is their tolerance for potential impacts to responders?
- Caution: Humans generally have a massive overestimation of our chances due to an "overconfidence effect" be wary of over-inflated ratings.
- Risk To Responder Probability ratings: Remember it the probability of the thing
 happening and impacting a responder(s) not of the thing happening in the first place
 (ex: not rapid-fire growth itself, but of an entrapment).



Strategy/SRA Meetings:

The Strategy/SRA Meeting brings all four pillars together in one discussion. It is recommended that AA, key stakeholders and the following IMT members attend at a minimum: IC, C&G, MEDL, FBAN/LTAN.

The following tips will help you be prepared for each SRA conversation while maximizing time together as a group:

- Ensure completion of SRA hallway homework: Gather and insert draft information into the product to get the conversation moving. Stress this isn't silo work, but stimulation for the larger group discussion.
- Time is valuable in the SRA meeting, so be sure to come into it with product at least partially filled out.

- Our goal for today will be: ______
- We will Accomplish this in _____minutes.
- o The value of the SRA is the conversation: Focus on:
 - What are we asking resources to protect and why?
 - How does that intersect with the 6 risk influencers?
 - How successful do we feel we will be with this Strategic Action (Probability of Success)?
- Embrace differing opinions & all perspectives
- Be present & engaged this conversation truly matters! Participation is essential.
- Meeting Flow: (Prompts may need to be used from previous sections)
 - Operations should provide the Strategic Action details, location, resources, and duration.
 - AAs (FMOs, READs) with ICs, OPs and SOF review the Critical Values at Risk, and re-confirm/adjust the Severity Rating for each.
 - FBAN, SOPL, LTAN, IMET, OPS: look at each Critical Value and determine the Probability of Impact.
 - Safety assesses/describes inputs for Risks to Responders. This should be supported by MEDL, AOBD, LSC, etc.
 - Finance will review the cost projection(s) for the strategic actions being discussed.
 - Operations should explain the P(Success) for the group to discuss.
- Conversation frequency should be driven by the incident's rhythm and will likely flex during the assignment. Meetings may occur daily until all Strategic Actions have been discussed then taper to every-other or every-third day unless the fire movement significantly changes, Strategic Actions are completed or new ones begin, players

- change (new AAs, landownership, etc.), or perhaps if the incident begins to feel almost routine and the group determines conversation is needed.
- Recognize the balance: input is valuable: organic conversation leads to revelations AND time will need to be carefully managed. Watch rabbit holes (some can be productive)
- Risk Philosophy: risk is personal and subjective: beware of talking about general risk too long (some is good to establish Common Operating Picture). Focus on existing, sitespecific factors only, not hazards/risks that COULD exist.
- This is like a brainstorming session no wrong answer or solutions.
- The goal is not to complete the product, but rather to stimulate rigorous conversation about risk. DO NOT get sucked into filling in the boxes on the form! That said, strive to have a product that captures what is discussed.
- Try using different methods to stimulate the conversation We want discussion and conversation, not rinse and repeat.
- Consider using red font when making changes in the Product to narrow focus in on what is new/different from previous versions.
- READs, local FMO, AAs in the room are critical for both pre-work discussions and during the Strategy/SRA conversations.
- During the Risk Influencer conversations Severity and Probability run together grab notes as the conversation flows. When talking about **Severity capture hazards**. When talking about **Probability capture mitigations**! It happens organically that they surface sobBe ready to add those in the notes boxes.
- It is recommended that a separate note-taker is identified to adequately capture the conversation notes.

This is a TEAM product, not a SAFETY task: everyone has their part in the success!

ISAP by Functional Area:

• <u>Finance:</u>

- Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout
- Monitor WFDSS financial allowances against the burn rates for each Strategic
 Action project and share when updates are likely to be needed.
- Pay attention to property/jurisdiction boundaries and how they overlap with strategic actions: anticipate future LUA or sunsetting of current LUAs
- As larger mobilization (or demob) of resources is discussed, prepare finance staff to meet the demand.
- Discuss within your section each potential strategic action (or alternative): What will other sections need to know from you? Who can get that information to help the overall IMT?

Benefits to Finance Section:

- Project potential for claims
- Incident population trends as work starts/is completed and assigned personnel change (adjust staffing, plan for surges, etc.)
- Be ready for new LUA/closing out if no longer needed

Logistics

- Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout
- Discuss within your section each potential strategic action (or alternative): What will other sections need to know from you? Who can get that information to help the overall IMT?
- Scout locations as needed (spikes, FOBs, MRB/Helibase, etc.)

Benefits to Logistics:

- Communications infrastructure needs projected sooner
- Remote camp locations/life expectancy and populations
- Ground support needs
- Medical infrastructure
- Knowledge of future fire support needs based on strategic lines
- Incident population trends as work starts/is completed and assigned personnel change (adjust number of toilets, wash stations, etc.)
- Insight into meal numbers and distribution as well as if resource may be projected to adjust shifts for upcoming burnouts, etc.

Plans

- o Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout
- Discuss within your section each potential strategic action (or alternative): What will other sections need to know from you? Who can get that information to help the overall IMT?

Benefits to Plans:

o Camp locations for IAPs known proactively (location, duration, population, etc.)

- Better understanding of how to support IC in framing up incident objectives tied to values.
- o Briefing needs (on site, radio, etc.) & messaging as well as IAP distribution
- Better understanding of resource needs (mob/demob) and resulting staffing needed to support ordering or release.
- Planning support for distributed operations
- Will help section, particularly situation unit, prioritize products being produced, and potentially reduce quantity, but increase quality of information shared.

Information

- o Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout
- Discuss within your section each potential strategic action (or alternative): What will other sections need to know from you? Who can get that information to help the overall IMT?

Benefits for Information:

- Messaging tidbits for multiple sources (social media, daily updates, interviews, etc.)
- Understanding decisions and able to articulate the Why
- Proactive knowledge of potential issues (ex: long duration smoke, evacuations or repopulations, etc.)

• Liaison

- Use it to preload evaluations or repopulation conversations and inform MAPs for these events.
- Assist with connecting operations with local officials seamlessly

Benefits for Liaisons:

- Relationship needs with Cooperators/stakeholders
- Engage right players sooner (law enforcement, EOCs)
- Better SA of decisions for messaging
- Proactive planning for evacuation/repopulation needs

Operations

- Brief to the Values: Add the Why behind the actions that have been/are being/will be taken
- Use the Strategic Actions verbatim on 204s.
- Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout

Safety

- State specific risks to responders and the controls/mitigations on each 204 in the special instructions: a short sentence that is relevant! Update them often so they catch attention and don't become wallpaper
- Help field safety officers understand the Why behind the actions that have been/are being/will be taken by using the specific Values.

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- Share the feedback and insights from the field with the IMT in the Strategy/SRA
 Meeting particularly in pillar 3/Responder Risk Influencers
- o Bring highlights back from Strategy/SRA meeting to functional breakout

Field Coaching Assignment Timeline

The timeline below outlines a "full" coaching assignment. Coaching assignments will vary from this timeline depending on the needs and expectations of the IC. ICs should identify needs and focus areas they'd like help focusing on during the Coaching visit. Teams that are new to ISAP or have had significant roster changes may benefit from the outlined schedule. *NOTE: preference is not to have coaches onsite during team transition day(s), but instead have them arrive after the official TOC.*

Day	Coaches Role	Objective
Pre-Travel or Travel Day Day 1	 Travel/Lodging/Logistics Initial Coach Contact with IC. Set up meeting time/locations for critical values at risk conversation Arrive at ICP; meet w/ICs or C&G based on IC preference. Provide overview of process and products as requested by IC. Identify coach workspace for duration of assignment. Initial Values at Risk Conversation Coach(s) will support to help facilitate conversations and 	 Coach will contact IC prior to inform of coach travel plans and ensure IC has prepped AA for values discussion and coach understand team needs to be successful. Gather SA for coaches Provide SRA/ Strat Ops overview and intent to the IMT and AA IMT & AAs are in alignment on the critical values and "why" they are
	 document the values identified and discussed by the AAs. Values should be identified spatially, but also listed out to track the severity ratings and other important info. regarding them. Identify time/location for 1st SRA meeting to take place. Begin one on one coaching and prep for first SRA (Hallway Homework) 	 important and "how" important they are Establish Core meeting time frames and prep for first SRA Provide intent for hallway homework and ensure approp. Personnel are involved.
Day 2	First SRA Meeting: coach will lead • Present first strategic action • Planning meeting prep Continue coaching IMT members & have identified IMT Facilitator shadow. Draft Strategic Operations Map • First paper exercise to draft strategic lines • Prep second strategic action – Hallway Homework • Continue one on one coaching in ops section (incl. FBAN/SOPL/LTAN)	 Coaching team leads the IMT/AA through the first SRA. Utilize this opportunity to model and lead the discussions. Keep group focused on each Strategic Action and the associated values and risks relevant to that area.
Day 3	Second SRA Meeting: coach will lead; IMT Facilitator may act as notetaker • Present second strategic action • Planning meeting prep Refine Strategic Operations Map • Continue one on one coaching as needed • Ops to prep third strategic action – Hallway Homework • Coordinate with GISS on strategic operational planning map development	 Coaching team leads the IMT/AA through the second SRA. Team is prepared and ready to lead the next day's SRA Core meeting.
Day 4	Third SRA Meeting: IMT leads and coach(s) observe & support as needed • Video/document cleanup • Exit meetings with IMT and AAs	 Observe, support, and provide feedback Ensure IMTs know where to find supporting materials & where to file documentation.
Travel Day	Travel	


NOTE: An additional day(s) may be added if needed to ensure team success. SRA / Strat Ops can split up and strat ops stay an additional day if needed to finish strat ops process.

Appendix

Appendix A: Product/Conversation Input Crosswalks

This section includes two ways to determine potential sources for getting input into the conversation/product. The first portion is the actual SRA product with data sources added in each section. The second chart will refer users to a variety of data inputs based on SRA product box numbers. These sources are not all inclusive – use whatever science, perspective and intel you have available.

Appendix A1: SRA Product Input Sources



Appendix A2: SRA Potential Sources by Product Box Number

	SRA: Source	SRA: Source Crosswalk	
		Information Source, Analytics or RMA	
SRA Element	IMT Functional Area	Dashboard Tab/Resource	Where on the RMA Dashboard
1. Strategic Action Details	Operations	na	na
2.Location	Operations	na	na
3. Resources Required	Operations	ICS-204s; RMA-Timeline Generator	Timeline Generator tab
3a. Personnel Required	Operations		
3b. Available Today	Operations		
4. Duration	Operations, SOPL, LTAN	Season-ending Analysis	Season-ending Analysis tab
5. Probability of Success	Operations	SDI, PCL & PODS	GIS Layers & Map Viewer tab
6. Discussion Notes	all/notetaker	na	na
7. Estimated Cost	Finance	na	na
		QWRA by 6th field watershed, Housing	
8. Critical Values	AA, AREP, READs, Local FMO, etc.	Density Layer, MS Bldgs Footprints	GIS Layers & Map Viewer tab
9. Severity of Impact	AA, AREP, READs, Local FMO, etc.	na	na
		FSPro, NTFB, Fire Danger, Severe	
10. Probability of Impact	FBAN, LTAN/SOPL, Operations	Weather & Fire Weather Matrix	all 3 are tabs on RMA Dashboard
11. Risk Rating	auto-populated	na	na
12. R1 Ground Transportation	Operations, Logistics, Safety	USA Hwys & NFSRs	GIS Layers & Map Viewer tab
	FBAN, LTAN/SOPL, Operations, local		
12. R2 Rapid Fire Growth	FMO	FSPro, NTFB, Fire Library	Fire Library Tab
12. R3 Hit-by-Hazards	Operations, Safety	Snag Hazard	GIS Layers & Map Viewer tab
			Aviation Use Summary Tab; must
12. R4 Aviation Operations	Air Ops, Operations	ICS-220; Aviation Use Summary	request
12. R5 Human Factors	all	Fire Library	Fire Library Tab
12. R6 Medical Response & Capability	MEDL, Logistics, Operations, Air Ops	ICS-206, Estimated Ground Evac. Layer	GIS Layers & Map Viewer tab
		Fire Library (progressions, long-term	
		assessments, burnovers, reivews)	
		Wilfire Evac Vulnerability for Rural	Fire Library Tab; GIS layers and Map
13. Severity of an Event	see above for each risk influencer	Communities (PNW only)	Viewer Tab
14. Probability of and Event	see above for each risk influencer	Season-ending Analysis	Season-ending Analysis tab
15. Risk Rating	auto-populated	na	na
16. Risk Mitigations	SOF/all/notetaker		
17. Risk Discussion	all/notetaker		

Appendix B: Risk Severity and Probability Definitions

Incident Strategic Alignment Process: Strategic Risk Assessment Terminology & Definitions v6

		Critical Va	lues at	Risk As	sessment							
Severity/Consequences if Fire Impact Occurs												
Catastrophic		Critica	al	Mo	oderate	ate Negligible						
Value is destroyed or		Value is destro	oyed or	Some porti	ion is unusable or	Minor damage or only						
unusable for months, v		unusable or rest			ut can be restored	temporarily unavailable or						
permanently affect th		weeks, impact can		within an acceptable timeframe, short-term impact			ricted, little to no action					
natural environment (irreversible), threat t		with appropriate threat to damage	-	-	snort-term impact to be addressed		ded for mitigations post					
survival of fauna, flor		flora, cultural,			kisting processes,		Itural/heritage resources,					
cultural, heritage	,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			nt of fauna, flora,		potentially beneficial					
				cultu	ral, heritage	res	ponse from fauna/flora					
		Probability/Lil			pacting Values							
Almost Certain		Likely	Poss	ible	Unlikely		Rare					
Expected to occur, or is		occur frequently,	Could occ		Remotely possible		Improbable, but has					
happening now	very	realistic to occur	specific co some o		not probable, co occur but deem		occurred in the past					
			conditions a		unfeasible	ea						
			evide		diffedsible							
		Respoi	nder Ris	k Asses	sment							
		Severity/Co										
Catastrophic	Critica	al .	Mo	oderate	Negligible							
Imminent & immedia		Permanent partia		Hospitaliz	ed minor injury,	Fin	First aid or minor medical					
danger of death or perma disability, major dama		temporary total	disability	rever	rsible illness		treatment					
,,		bability/Likelih	nood of a	Mishap if	Hazard is Pres	sent						
Almost Certain		Likely	Poss	ible	Unlikely		Rare					
Expected to occur, or is	Will	occur frequently,	Could occ	cur under	Remotely possible	but	Improbable, but has					
happening now	very	realistic to occur	specific co		not probable, co		occurred in the past					
			some o conditions a		occur but deem unfeasible	ed						
			evide		unieasible							
Severit	v/Co	nseauences if	a Mishap	Occurs: I	EMS Response	Cap	ability					
					yer or field verific							
Catastrophic		Critica			oderate		Negligible					
>6 hours (ex. RMA Re	d)	4-5 hours (ex			urs (ex. RMA	<1 h	nour (ex. RMA Green/no					
	Dro	Yellow/Ora			en/Yellow) sponse Capab	ility	color)					
Almost Cortain	FIUI					ility	Dava					
Almost Certain	Data	Likely ntial for barriers to	Poss Barriers un		Unlikely	all	Rare					
Will encounter barriers, not able to get desired		r with plan; issues	condition		Medical response likely go accordin		Medical response will go according to plan, all					
resources or		etting desired	availability	•	plan, most of th		desired resources at					
appropriate level of	reso	urces/ care levels	resources/		desired resource		appropriate care level					
care					appropriate care l	evel	are on hand					
					are on hand							

Appendix C: Responder Risk Category Descriptions

6 Major Risk Influencer Description:

Ground Transportation: ALL ground movement to/from & at the work area: Driving (engines, heavy equipment, rentals, operational & support functions, etc.), UTV/ATV, hiking, pack strings, boats, etc.

Rapid Fire Growth: Think Entrapment: escape routes/safety zones, disengagement points, fuel conditions & indices, event predictability, etc.

Hit-by-Hazards: Gravity Hazards: Snags, green trees, rolling rocks, topography, etc.

Aviation Operations: All aviation use (manned/unmanned): Logistical support, operational tasks scooping/dipping, water sources, UAS, etc.

Human Factors: All things human-related: internal/external pressures real or perceived, communication, leadership, social-political, etc.

Medical Response & Capability: How resilient is our system to support from a medical standpoint - NOT how severe of an injury!

Appendix D: Risk Assessment Matrix

		Probability Likelihood of Event Occurring									
Risi	k Assessment Matrix	Almost Certain (expected to occur or is happening now)	Likely (Will occur frequently/very realistic to occur)	Possible (could occur under specific conditions & some of those conditions are currently evidenced)	Unlikely (Remotely possible but not probable, could occur but deemed unfeasible)	Rare (Improbable; but has occurred in the past)					
S	Catastrophic	Extremely High	Extremely High	Extremely High	High	Moderate					
erity Event Occur	Critical	Extremely High	Extremely High	High	Moderate	Moderate					
Severity Consequence if Event Occurs	Moderate	High	High	Moderate	Low	Low					
0	Negligible	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low					

Appendix E: Risk Summary Graph Interpretation

Using the Strategic Risk Assessment Ranked Risk Summary

The Ranked Risk Summary is intended to take the data entered each Strategic Action and display it in a more visual way that helps guide conversation. It is not a decision-making tool, but rather it provides a look at how components of the Strategic Action relate to each other. The Summary can also help inform messaging and inputs to other products (215A/R (operational risk assessment), ICS-208 (safety message), ICS-206 (medical plan), ICS-204 (division work assignments), etc.).

How to Use the SRA Graph:

The graph is not meant to be used as a Go/No Go checklist. The graph display what values are most at risk, and what hazards pose the highest risk to responders for that Strategic Action.

It goes without saying that our work is inherently dangerous and unintended outcomes can arise at any point on the charts – Red, Yellow or Green. The chart should help identify areas to focus conversation on acceptable risk for the AA and the IMT given the importance of the Values and the potential resulting risk to responders.

Areas in the Orange and Red portions also indicate risks that may need to be more deliberately addressed in planning efforts – mitigations and controls beyond SOPs, standard training and checklists that generally address risks in the green or yellow areas.


While all responder risks should be addressed at the operational level and listed in the 215 A/R, those with the highest ratings (plotting in the red areas of the charts) should spur conversation with the IMT and AA to ensure that there is alignment and understanding of the risks responders are being asked to take to protect the critical values. Additionally, this information can inform briefings at the appropriate level (ex: IAP messages for all responders or those directed at specific portions of the incident via ICS-204 and Division breakouts).

"What is driving this higher rating?" and "What controls are in place to reduce exposure?" are two questions the IMT should be prepared to answer and discuss with AA.

Mechanics of the Line Graph:


On the line graph, the risk ratings are ranked and displayed with the lowest ratings on the lower left corner of the chart and moving up and to the right as the risk rating increases. There is a dashed line for Critical Values and a solid line for Responder Risk Influencers. The lines automatically plot based on the risk ratings entered along a curve, so the background color may not always match the actual rating for each risk. This gives a visual display of the risk associated with each Value or Influencer. By noticing the trends in the lines, and where/if the lines intersect, users can determine which Values are most critically at risk, and which responder risks pose the highest assessed levels.

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Other Resources:

Other Resources 1: 2023 Blank SRA Product v3



Other Resources 2: Critical Values at Risk Template

*				11	131		ΙΡ						Priority
*Smoke Impacts and Socioeconomic risks are difficult to quantify relative to other values or to firefighter risks. However they can and often do inform strategy; while we do not recommend populating these within a strategic action under values, they absolutely must be considered and can be documented within the discussion box.												1 Public Safety Repeater Network	rity Critical Value at Risk
quantify relative to oth caction under values,												Catastrophic	Severity of Impact
ficult to quantify relative to other values or to firefighter risks. However they can and often do inform strategy; while strategic action under values, they absolutely must be considered and can be documented within the discussion box.												North of current perimeter	General Location
ey can and often do inform strategy; while 1 be documented within the discussion box												Reliant on hydro power	Susceptibility Notes
י we do not recommend populating these within a: י.													General Notes





Other Resources 3: Probability of Success Calculator

Probability of Success P(success) Calculator

 $\frac{(\text{PCL}_{\text{SDI}}\text{-P(spot)})|\text{ERC x}}{\text{Resources}_{\text{Required}}} \times \text{P(Completion)} \mid \text{ArrivalTime}$

- Step 1: Acquire or create a normalized and combined PCL and SDI layer. Use the average value (between 1 and 9) of the line segment of the strategic action in block 2. Research is working on web app to create this layer -hopefully by spring.
- Step 2: Acquire an FSPro run for more days than the expected duration of the strategic action. For example, if the strategic action will take 7 days to accomplish, consider a 10 to 14 day FSPro. Use today's ERC percentile from a representative station for input in block 1 (you can use the FSPro ERC Bin today falls in). Input the duration of the FSPro and probability of impact to the area in question in blocks 3 and 4.
- Step 3: Select the most representative vegetation group from the drop down in block 5.
- Step 4: Select the strategic action in question (once populated on the 'SA' tabs) from the drop down below to populate questions 6-8 below.

	Strategic Act	1	
1. ERC Percentile	2. PCLSDI Average	3. FSPro duration	4. FSPro Probability
	Value of Line	(days)	along line
80-89	8	14	5-19%
5. Fuel Model Group	6. Resources On Site	7. Resources	8. Days Required for
	and Available Today	Required for Action	Action
Timber	120	150	7

Probability of Success as assessed by:

Strategic Action	This Method	Difference
80%	69%	-11%

Probability of success changes by the hour, it is important to understand that any calculation thereof is only valid in the space and time that it is created in. If responder risks cannot first be mitigated to acceptable levels any calculation of P(success) is invalid. Many methods can be used to estimate P(success) - this one just incorporates many relevant factors into one estimate. This method will likely vary significantly from expert assessed estimates - it is supposed to provide a more quantitative estimate as a baseline of comparison and discussion. Importantly, just because a low estimate may be provided, if the objective of the strategic action could result in significant losses being avoided, it may be prudent to attempt the action. A low probability/high consequence action may warrant serious consideration and discussion when the values to be protected are of significant importance.

Other Resources 4: How to Provide Feedback

ISAP:SRA/StratOps Feedback Form



Other Resources 5: Getting Additional Information

ISAP:SRA/StratOps Storymap

Contact Us:

Email SME Group

Request an ISAP Presentation:

ISAP Presentation/Workshop Request Form

